Our latest predictions on major currency pairs and practical steps businesses can take to mitigate exchange rate risk exposure.
Our latest predictions on major currency pairs and practical steps businesses can take to mitigate exchange rate risk exposure.
Date: January 3, 2026
If the final trading days of 2025 felt like a champagne toast to the long-awaited “Soft Landing,” the opening sessions of 2026 are beginning to resemble the morning after. As global markets find their footing in the first full trading week of the new year, investor sentiment has turned notably more cautious—driven less by equity exuberance and more by a sharp repricing in the energy complex.
Brent crude has slid below $61 a barrel, marking its lowest sustained level since the pandemic-era demand shock of 2020. While the macro backdrop today is fundamentally different, the price action reinforces a warning the International Energy Agency has echoed for much of the past year: global oil supply growth is once again running ahead of demand. The issue is not a collapse in consumption, but rather an abundance of barrels entering the market simultaneously.
The emerging “Great Glut” of 2026 is no longer theoretical. Even as OPEC+ has signaled a continued pause on further production increases, output growth from non-OPEC producers, most notably the United States, Guyana, and Brazil, has proven sufficient to overwhelm incremental demand growth. According to recent U.S. Energy Information Administration projections, this imbalance could persist well into the first half of the year. For consumers, the implication is broadly positive, with U.S. gasoline prices projected to drift toward the $3.00-per-gallon range this quarter, assuming crude prices remain under pressure. For equity markets, however, the story is more complicated.
While energy represents a relatively modest share of the S&P 500 by weight, the sector still plays an outsized role in earnings momentum and inflation expectations. A sustained downturn in oil prices threatens to weigh on aggregate earnings growth and dampen index-level performance at a time when valuations elsewhere remain elevated. Even the continued dominance of the so-called “Magnificent Seven” may not be sufficient to fully offset renewed weakness in cyclically sensitive sectors.
That tension is already evident in the growing divergence among Wall Street’s largest forecasting houses. Goldman Sachs reiterated a bullish outlook this week, maintaining its call for the S&P 500 to reach 7,600 by year-end, citing AI-driven productivity gains and the potential tailwind from corporate tax relief. Morgan Stanley, by contrast, has struck a more cautious tone, warning that the artificial intelligence trade is entering a “show me” phase. As capital expenditures rise, investors are increasingly demanding near-term cash flow and margin expansion, not just long-duration growth narratives. The gap between these views suggests that 2026 may reward selectivity rather than broad exposure, with sharp sector rotations replacing the rising-tide dynamics of recent years.
Geopolitics adds another layer of complexity. Control Risks’ newly released RiskMap 2026 identifies “Transactionalism” as the defining risk for global business, underscoring the erosion of predictable, rules-based international cooperation. Long-standing alliances are increasingly giving way to ad hoc, deal-driven arrangements, a trend visible in the fragile U.S.–China détente, which continues to show signs of strain. For multinational firms and supply chain managers, this environment implies greater volatility, as tariffs, export controls, and regulatory sovereignty measures can emerge with little warning.
The Bottom Line: The traditional “January Effect” is colliding with a wall of supply, both in physical commodities and in financial markets. Lower energy prices should ultimately support consumer spending and help anchor inflation expectations, but the near-term impact on energy earnings and market sentiment is proving destabilizing. For now, defensive positioning appears prudent as investors watch whether oil can sustainably hold the $60 level. A decisive break lower would reinforce broader disinflationary signals and could, over time, force the Federal Reserve to reassess the durability of its current policy pause.
Goldman Sachs. (2025). 2026 Outlooks: Some Like It Hot. (Retrieved 2026, January 3).
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/outlooks/2026-outlooks
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2025, December 9). Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global Oil Prices Forecast.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/
Control Risks. (2025). RiskMap 2026: The New Rules – No Rules World.
https://www.controlrisks.com/riskmap/top-risks/the-new-rules-no-rules-world
Investing.com. (2025, December 31). Goldman Sachs forecasts 11% S&P 500 rise in 2026 amid economic growth.
https://www.investing.com/news/analyst-ratings/goldman-sachs-forecasts-11-sp-500-rise-in-2026-amid-economic-growth-93CH-4426751
Rigzone. (2026, January 2). Oil Fluctuates as Traders Weigh Surplus, Geopolitical Risks.
https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/oil_fluctuates_as_traders_weigh_surplus_geopolitical_risks-02-jan-2026-182677-article/
January 14, 2026
If Tuesday was a warning shot, today is the main event. Wall Street faces a “Super Wednesday” of volatility as a deluge of critical bank earnings, Federal Reserve commentary, and economic data hits the wires simultaneously. The pre-market mood is tense, shaped largely by the shocking 4% tumble in JPMorgan Chase (JPM) shares yesterday, a decline that signaled investors are no longer satisfied with mere stability. They are demanding growth in an environment where credit margins are being squeezed by policy risks and sticky inflation. As trading desks come online, all eyes are on the trio of financial giants reporting before the bell: Bank of America (BAC), Wells Fargo (WFC), and Citigroup (C). The stakes could not be higher. With JPMorgan serving as the canary in the coal mine yesterday, the “whisper numbers” for its peers have been hurriedly revised downward.
The core anxiety isn’t just about earnings per share; it is about the “credit cliff.” Traders are parsing these reports for signs that the record credit card delinquencies seen in late 2025 are bleeding into broader loan books. CEO Jamie Dimon’s comments yesterday regarding the proposed 10% cap on credit card interest rates sent a chill through the sector. His warning that such regulation would “decimate credit availability” has put the spotlight firmly on Citigroup today. With Citi’s branded card net credit loss guidance sitting at a steep 3.50%–4.00%, any upward revision in those loss reserves could trigger a sector-wide sell-off. Similarly, analysts are expecting Bank of America to post revenue of roughly $27.8 billion, but the real test will be Net Interest Income (NII). If BofA’s NII continues to compress while credit costs rise, it validates the bear case: that banks are trapped between falling yields on assets and rising costs of deposits.
The macroeconomic backdrop offers little comfort. Yesterday’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) print, showing headline inflation ticking up to 2.7% annually, has effectively taken a March rate cut off the table for many strategists. Today’s focus shifts to the Producer Price Index (PPI) and Retail Sales data due at 8:30 AM ET. The bond market is already voting with its feet; yields are creeping higher as issuers rush to lock in capital before rates potentially spike further. Last week saw a historic $95 billion in U.S. investment-grade bond issuance, a “panic buying” of liquidity that suggests corporate treasurers expect borrowing costs to remain elevated through 2026. This isn’t just a US phenomenon, as the catastrophe bond market just shattered annual records with $25.6 billion in new issuance, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) just priced a record AUD 1 billion “Amazonia Bond.” The world is flooding the market with paper, and indigestion is setting in.
Adding to the complexity, the Federal Reserve is out in force today. Heavyweights like New York Fed President John Williams and Atlanta’s Raphael Bostic are scheduled to speak. Bostic, who is presenting at the Atlanta Business Chronicle 2026 Economic Outlook at 11:00 AM CT, will be scrutinized closely. If he doubles down on the “patience” narrative following the hot CPI print, it could trigger a liquidity squeeze in the afternoon session.
The market is currently trapped between “good news is bad news” (strong retail sales = more inflation) and “bad news is bad news” (weak bank earnings = recession risk). For the next 24 hours, forget the AI hype and the tech sector; the direction of the S&P 500 will be determined by the boring, gritty reality of loan loss reserves and producer price margins.
References
November 19, 2025
The economic relationship between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is increasingly shaped by the tension between Washington’s push for deeper strategic cooperation and ASEAN’s emphasis on multilateral economic integration. Following the ASEAN Summit, the U.S. move toward more reciprocal trade arrangements has sought to influence regional supply chains by linking preferential market access with broader strategic commitments (Brownstein, 2025). Under this approach, ASEAN members that have formal agreements, such as Malaysia and Cambodia, and those participating through frameworks, such as Vietnam and Thailand, remain within the U.S. reciprocal tariff regime but may receive targeted exemptions. This has created a differentiated tariff landscape influenced by each country’s alignment track record rather than purely economic considerations (Dezan Shira & Associates, 2025).
This tiered structure places ASEAN in a difficult position despite its demonstrated economic resilience. While the United States is ASEAN’s fourth-largest trading partner, the region’s trade with China is more than twice that volume, underscoring Beijing’s central role in regional production networks (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2025). U.S. tariff measures also aim to curb China’s regional influence by imposing higher duties on goods suspected of being rerouted or transshipped through ASEAN economies, prompting member states to strengthen their customs enforcement to address U.S. concerns over duty circumvention (Bangkok Post, 2025). These compliance requirements, however, clash with ASEAN’s heavy dependence on Chinese inputs and capital, generating both political sensitivity and operational challenges for states trying to maintain strategic neutrality (Bangkok Post, 2025).
At the same time, China is expanding its own regional economic footprint by advancing multilateral initiatives such as the upgraded ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA 3.0). The new framework emphasizes cooperation in digital trade, supply chain resilience, and standards harmonization, positioning China as a more stable long-term economic partner and offering ASEAN an institutional buffer against external policy volatility (ThinkChina, 2025). The broader geopolitical signal is clear: while ASEAN leaders still describe Washington as an important strategic counterweight, the more predictable and institution-driven nature of China’s economic engagement may encourage a gradual structural tilt toward Beijing if U.S. trade policy continues to shift toward short-term, transactional arrangements (East Asia Forum, 2025).
References
Bangkok Post. (2025). Southeast Asia squeezed by superpowers. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/3137651/southeast-asia-squeezed-by-superpowers
Brownstein. (2025). President Trump Reaches Trade Agreements with Southeast Asian Countries. https://www.bhfs.com/insight/president-trump-reaches-trade-agreements-with-southeast-asian-countries/
Dezan Shira & Associates. (2025). U.S. Tariffs in Asia 2025 – A Regional Investment Map. https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/u-s-tariffs-in-asia-2025-a-regional-investment-map/
East Asia Forum. (2025). Trump tariffs tilt Southeast Asia towards China. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/09/23/trump-tariffs-tilt-southeast-asia-towards-china/
Heinrich Böll Foundation. (2025). In A Turbulent World, ASEAN Needs to Do Its Internal Homework. https://th.boell.org/en/2025/07/18/turbulent-world-asean-needs-do-its-internal-homework
ThinkChina. (2025). ACFTA 3.0: The China-ASEAN deal that could shake US influence? https://www.thinkchina.sg/economy/acfta-3-0-china-asean-deal-could-shake-us-influence
January 30, 2026
The global trade landscape is shifting as major economies pursue bilateral deals and strategic partnerships to secure market access and supply-chain resilience. In late January 2026 there was a concentration of diplomatic activity that highlights a strategic emphasis on direct trade engagement, moving away from purely multilateral frameworks toward more targeted, reciprocal arrangements. Notably, the United States and El Salvador concluded a groundbreaking reciprocal trade pact, while the United Kingdom secured several agreements during Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to Beijing. These developments come as emerging economies such as Thailand confront challenges from heightened tariffs and global competition.
On January 29, 2026, the United States and El Salvador signed the first Agreement on Reciprocal Trade in the Western Hemisphere, formalizing a framework intended to reduce non-tariff barriers and deepen bilateral commerce. The text of the deal focuses on enhancing market access for U.S. exports, aligning regulatory standards, and reinforcing supply-chain linkages, while El Salvador commits to streamlining regulatory processes and lowering certain barriers to U.S. goods. USTR Jamieson Greer described the agreement as strengthening existing ties and lowering barriers for American producers.
At roughly the same time, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer completed a multi-day visit to China in a bid to strengthen economic cooperation. This trip, the first by a UK prime minister to Beijing since 2018, resulted in China agreeing to allow visa-free travel for British citizens for stays up to 30 days, aimed at facilitating tourism and business engagement. Officials also announced intentions to pursue a feasibility study for a bilateral services agreement, which would set clearer rules for UK companies operating in China, particularly in sectors like finance, healthcare, education, and professional services.
Outside of the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, Thailand, Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, is facing headwinds from global trade pressures. According to recent forecasts reflecting government and economic think tank data, Thailand’s economic growth is expected to remain modest in 2026, supported by strong tourism and domestic demand but challenged by slower export momentum. Exports are predicted to be flat or only marginally higher, weighed down by global trade volatility, high household debt, and a strong baht, while foreign arrivals are projected to be around 35.5 million, bolstering the services sector.
The rise of reciprocal trade frameworks and direct bilateral engagement reflects a broader rebalancing of the global commercial order. Whether it’s Washington’s push for reciprocal market access in the Americas or London’s pragmatic engagement with Beijing’s expansive economy, the emphasis is on securing clear rules and tangible advantages for national exporters and investors. For businesses, this evolving environment presents both opportunities and uncertainties, requiring agile responses as shifting tariffs or new visa rules can impact operations and competitiveness with little notice.
References
USTR. (2026, January 29). Ambassador Greer Signs the U.S.–El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/january/ambassador-greer-signs-us-el-salvador-agreement-reciprocal-trade
USA Rice Federation. (2026, January 29). USTR’s Reciprocal Trade Agreement with El Salvador Addresses Longstanding Fraudulent Rice Issue. https://www.usarice.com/news-and-events/publications/usa-rice-daily/article/2026/01/29/ustr-s-reciprocal-trade-agreement-with-el-salvador-addresses-longstanding-fraudulent-rice-issue
Reuters. (2026, January 29). El Salvador signs trade agreement with US. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-signs-reciprocal-trade-agreement-with-us-2026-01-29/
Reuters. (2026, January 29). China agrees some visa-free travel for British citizens, UK says. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/china-agrees-some-visa-free-travel-british-citizens-says-uk-pm-2026-01-29/
Reuters. (2026, January 28). UK’s Starmer arrives in China, encourages firms to seize opportunities. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britains-starmer-heads-china-western-alliances-face-strain-2026-01-28/
Reuters. (2026, January 27). Thai finance ministry maintains 2026 growth forecast at 2.0% despite weaker exports. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-finance-ministry-maintains-2026-growth-forecast-20-2026-01-27/
Business Today / Malaysian news (2026, January 27). Thailand Keeps 2.0% Growth Forecast As Export Outlook Improves. https://www.businesstoday.com.my/2026/01/27/thailand-keeps-2-0-growth-forecast-as-export-outlook-improves/
WASHINGTON D.C. / NEW DELHI — The United States and India have announced an interim agreement to ease trade tensions and expand economic cooperation, sparking strong market reactions and strategic debate. Following a call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on February 2, 2026, both governments confirmed progress toward lowering trade barriers after months of tariff friction.
The central feature of the announcement is a reduction in U.S. tariffs on Indian imports. Washington said it will cut “reciprocal” tariffs on most Indian goods to around 18%, down from an effective levy near 50% imposed during 2025 in response to disputes including India’s energy ties. India has also agreed to cut some of its tariffs and non-tariff barriers on U.S. products, although the full implementing text has not yet been publicly released.
Indian officials have welcomed the tariff rollback as a positive step, noting that reduced duties will help restore export competitiveness in key sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery and engineering goods that were disrupted by last year’s steep U.S. levies.
As part of the broader deal narrative, the U.S. government highlighted a commitment by India to significantly increase purchases of American products, including energy, technology and agricultural goods, with a total figure often cited around $500 billion over several years. Analysts stress this figure is an aspirational target rather than a legally binding order book, reflecting broader economic cooperation ambitions.
The White House characterized the pact as aligning India more closely with U.S. geopolitical priorities by encouraging a shift away from Russian oil purchases. India’s official statements have been more cautious on this issue, and Moscow has said it has received no formal notification of policy changes. Independent analysts note India’s energy needs are diversified and such a transition would be gradual and conditional on domestic considerations.
Indian stock markets reacted positively, with major indices rising in response to the news. U.S. analysts and policy experts describe the announcement as a confidence-building measure that could unlock longer-term cooperation but caution that details, compliance mechanisms and sensitive sectors, especially agriculture and dairy, remain subject to ongoing negotiation.
While described by officials as a “breakthrough,” observers stress the deal is still in progress rather than fully ratified. Many elements, like the schedule of tariff cuts, regulatory cooperation, and enforcement, have yet to be detailed in a finalized agreement. The current announcement is best understood as an interim framework signaling intent to deepen trade ties as part of a broader economic and strategic alignment.
References
Al Jazeera. (2026, February 3). Modi, Trump announce India-US ‘trade deal’: What we know and what we don’t. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/modi-trump-announce-india-us-trade-deal-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont
Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, February 3). U.S.-India trade truce announced. https://www.cfr.org/articles/u-s-india-trade-truce-announced
Hindustan Times. (2026, February 3). Trump announces India-US trade deal; tariffs reduced from 50% to 18%. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-us-talks-donald-trump-phone-call-narendra-modi-sergio-gor-101770047934666.html
The Hindu. (2026, February 3). India-U.S. trade deal LIVE: Industry welcomes deal, sees tariff cuts boosting growth and competitiveness. https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-us-trade-deal-the-hindu-live-updates-reactions-details-tariffs-trump-modi-february-3-2026/article70585870.ece
Times of India. (2026, February 3). India-US trade deal: Some key questions that still remain unanswered. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/india-us-trade-deal-some-key-questions-that-still-remain-unanswered/articleshow/127888954.cms
December 9, 2025
The global economic narrative today is shaped by renewed momentum in United States–India trade talks, set against new data confirming the structural resilience of China’s export machine, even as U.S. tariffs continue to weigh on Sino-U.S. trade.
A delegation from the United States, led by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rick Switzer, is scheduled to meet counterparts in New Delhi from December 10–11, 2025, to begin discussions on the first phase of a proposed bilateral trade agreement. While some Indian officials have signalled optimism about finalising an initial deal by year-end, sources stress that this round may serve more as a preliminary or exploratory session rather than a formal negotiation. The broader ambition remains to reach the goals outlined under Mission 500, boosting bilateral trade to US $500 billion by 2030.
China’s Trade Surplus Hits Record: Meanwhile, China’s goods trade surplus has exceeded US $1 trillion for the first time ever (first 11 months of 2025), according to customs data, marking a substantial increase from 2024’s total of about US $992 billion.
In November, Chinese exports rebounded 5.9% year-on-year while imports rose only 1.9%, yielding a single-month surplus of roughly US $112 billion. Though exports to the United States fell sharply, nearly 29% in November, China seems to have offset much of the loss by diversifying export markets toward regions such as Southeast Asia, Europe, Australia, and beyond. This outcome underscores the limits of tariffs alone in curbing China’s global export reach.
The US–India negotiations come at a critical juncture. Facing rising competition in global supply chains, India may view a trade deal with the U.S. as a way to solidify its role as an alternative manufacturing and export hub, especially amid China’s continued dominance in exports. Yet, whether this “first tranche” will materialize as a binding agreement by year-end, or remain preliminary, is still uncertain. On the China side, although the trade-surplus milestone is impressive, analysts caution that long-term vulnerabilities remain, including weak domestic demand, overreliance on external markets, and rising geopolitical scrutiny from other trading partners.
References
A guide to the rapidly evolving landscape of international technology transfer regulations and compliance requirements.
The contemporary international trade regime is witnessing a fundamental reconfiguration, characterized by the convergence of aggressive environmental policy and protectionist trade measures. This phenomenon, increasingly termed “eco-protectionism,” represents a departure from the era of uninhibited globalization toward a system where market access is contingent upon environmental performance (UNCTAD, 2025). For global organizations, this shift signals that sustainability governance can no longer be siloed within corporate social responsibility departments; rather, it has become a central pillar of trade compliance and competitive strategy.
As the transitional phase of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) concludes in late 2025, the distinction between sustainability compliance and financial viability is rapidly eroding. Commencing in 2026, the shift from mere data reporting to mandatory financial liability for embedded carbon emissions will fundamentally alter the cost structures of imported goods, particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as steel, aluminum, and fertilizers (European Commission, 2025). Consequently, firms that fail to accurately account for and reduce the carbon intensity of their supply chains face the dual risk of prohibitive tariffs and exclusion from the Single Market.
Beyond the immediate fiscal implications of European regulations, the rise of eco-protectionism is fostering a fragmented global market characterized by “green friend-shoring.” Recent economic analyses suggest that multinational enterprises are increasingly restructuring supply networks to prioritize jurisdictions with low-carbon energy grids and regulatory alignment, thereby mitigating the risk of future carbon tariffs from other major economies like the United States or China (White & Case, 2025). This geopolitical fragmentation compels organizations to assess geopolitical risk not merely through the lens of political stability, but through the metric of carbon diplomacy and environmental reciprocity.
To navigate this volatile landscape, multinational enterprises must transition from passive reporting to active supply chain decarbonization. Strategic resilience in 2026 and beyond requires the implementation of deep-tier supply chain auditing to capture Scope 3 emissions data with the same rigor applied to financial accounting (Dawgen Global, 2025). Ultimately, in an era defined by eco-protectionism, the ability to demonstrate a low-carbon footprint is no longer a reputational asset, but a prerequisite for maintaining global market access.
Dawgen Global. (2025). Emerging trends in global trade and investment for 2025 and beyond. https://www.dawgen.global/emerging-trends-in-global-trade-and-investment-for-2025-and-beyond/
European Commission. (2025). Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Transition phase and definitive regime. Taxation and Customs Union. https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en
UNCTAD. (2025). Global trade update: Resilience under pressure. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https://unctad.org/publication/global-trade-update-october-2025-global-trade-remains-strong-despite-policy-changes-and
White & Case. (2025). Overview of foreign trade 2025. Insight Alert. https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/overview-foreign-trade-2025
